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Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response cor-
respondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response
equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoﬀ diﬀer-
ences and beliefs. Some “potential game”arguments (cf. Monderer and Shapley,
1996, Games Econ. Behav. 14, 124–143) rely only on the property that potential
games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show
that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games,
but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game argu-
ments can be extended.
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11 Introduction
We consider three progressively stronger equivalence relations on games and characterize
each of them.
• Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response cor-
respondence.
• Two games are better-response equivalent if, for every pair of strategies, they agree
when one strategy is better than the other.
• Two games are von Neumann-Morgenstern equivalent (VNM-equivalent) if, for
each player, the payoﬀ function in one game is equal to a constant times the payoﬀ
function in the other game, plus a function that depends only on the opponents’
strategies.
Two games are VNM-equivalent if and only if, for each player i, there is a constant
wi > 0 such that the ratio of payoﬀ diﬀerences from switching between one strategy to
another strategy is always wi. The constant wi is thus independent of the strategies
being compared.
Two games are better-response equivalent if and only if they have the same dominance
relations and, for each player i and each pair of strategies ai and a 
i such that neither
strategy strictly dominates the other, there exists a constant wi > 0 such that the ratio
of payoﬀ diﬀerences from switching between ai and a 
i is always wi. In general, this is a
weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence. It is weaker both because the proportional
payoﬀ diﬀerences property is no longer required to hold between some strategy pairs, and
because the weight wi is not necessarily independent of the strategy pair. But if the game
does not have dominated strategies, the weights can no longer depend on the strategies
being compared, and better-response equivalence collapses to VNM-equivalence.
Two games are best-response equivalent if and only if, for each player i and each pair
of strategies ai and a 
i such that both strategies are a best response to some belief, there
exists a constant wi > 0 such that the ratio of payoﬀ diﬀerences from switching between
2ai and a 
i is always wi. Even if a game has no dominated strategies, this is a weaker
requirement than VNM-equivalence. In games with diminishing marginal returns, best-
response equivalence is always a strictly weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence.
Examples are given in the paper.
The most extensive discussion and applications of these relations has come in the
literature on potential games. Monderer and Shapley [10] said that a game was a “po-
tential game”if there exists a potential function, deﬁned on the strategy space, with
the property that the change in any player’s payoﬀ function from switching between any
two of his strategies (holding other players’ strategies ﬁxed) was equal to the change
in the potential function.1 A game is “weighted potential game,”if the payoﬀ changes
are proportional for each player. Thus a game is a weighted potential game if and only
if it is VNM-equivalent to a game with identical payoﬀ functions. While some results
using potential or weighted potential game arguments are using the VNM-equivalence to
identical interest games, other arguments are just using the better-response equivalence
and even only best-response equivalence implications of VNM-equivalence.2 Any paper
that deals only with equilibrium is using only best-response equivalence (e.g., Neyman
[13], Ui [19], Morris and Ui [12]). Similarly, ﬁctitious play only uses the best-response
properties of the game (Monderer and Shapley [9]).3 An application using only better-
response equivalence but not the VNM-equivalence appears in Morris [11]. Some papers
studying quantal responses or stochastic best responses in potential games use the full
power of VNM-equivalence (e.g., Blume [2], Brock and Durlauf [3], Anderson et al. [1],
Ui [20]).4
1See also Ui [18] for a characterization and examples of potential games.
2Arguments that exploit potential arguments to prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
(e.g., Rosenthal [15]) only use ordinal properties of payoﬀs. Monderer and Shapley [10] introduced
ordinal potential games and Voorneveld [21] and Dubey et al. [4] showed how ordinal potential games
can be weakened to only require pure strategy best-response equivalence.
3Sela [17] establishes convergence of ﬁctitious play in a class of “One-Against-All” games. These are
games best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but not potential games.
4More precisely, they use the full power of VNM-equivalence such that the constant wi is the same
for all the players.
3The fact that VNM-equivalence is the same as better-response equivalence in the ab-
sence of dominated strategies and may be diﬀerent in the presence of dominated strategies
has been noted in a number of contexts (see Sela [16], Blume [2] p409, Monderer and
Shapley [10] footnote 9, and Maskin and Tirole [6] p209). However, our characteriza-
tions of better-response equivalence in the presence of dominated strategies and of the
signiﬁcant gap between better-response equivalence and best-response equivalence ﬁll a
gap in the literature.5
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our notions of equivalence
and give an example illustrating the diﬀerences. In section 3, we report our character-
izations. In section 4, we restrict attention to a class of games where best-response
equivalence is a strictly weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence and characterize the
class of games. We also discuss an extension to games with inﬁnite strategy spaces and
its application.
2 Equivalence Properties of Games
A game consists of a ﬁnite set of players N and a ﬁnite strategy set Ai for i ∈ N, and
a payoﬀ function gi : A → R for i ∈ N where A =
 
i∈N Ai. We write A−i =
 
j =iAj
and a−i =( aj)j =i ∈ A−i. We simply denote a game by g =( gi)i∈N. Throughout the
paper, we regard gi(ai,·):A−i → R as a vector in RA−i. We write gi(ai,·)   gi(a 
i,·)i f
gi(ai,a −i) >g i(a 
i,a −i) for all a−i ∈ A−i, and gi(ai,·) ≥ gi(a 
i,·)i fgi(ai,a −i) ≥ gi(a 
i,a −i)
for all a−i ∈ A−i.
For i ∈ N, let ∆(A−i) denote the set of all probability distributions over A−i.W e
call each element of ∆(A−i) player i’s belief. For Xi ⊆ Ai, let Λi(ai,X i|gi) ⊆ ∆(A−i)
be a set of player i’s beliefs such that player i with a payoﬀ function gi and a belief
5Mertens [8] studied various notions of best-response equivalence, but with his more abstract strategy
spaces and focus on admissible best responses, there is little overlap with the material in this paper.
4λi ∈ Λi(ai,X i|gi) weakly prefers ai to any strategy in Xi:
Λi(ai,X i|gi)





gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a 
i,a −i)
 
≥ 0 for all a 
i ∈ Xi}.
When Xi is a singleton, i.e., Xi = {a 
i}, we write Λi(ai,a  
i|gi) instead of Λi(ai,{a 
i}|gi).
We are interested in characterizing two equivalence relations on games captured by
these sets of beliefs by which players prefer one particular strategy.
Deﬁnition 1 A game g is better-response equivalent to g  =( g 
i)i∈N if, for each i ∈ N,
Λi(ai,a  
i|gi)=Λ i(ai,a  
i|g 
i)
for all ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.
Deﬁnition 2 A game g is best-response equivalent to g  =( g 
i)i∈N if, for each i ∈ N,
Λi(ai,A i|gi)=Λ i(ai,A i|g 
i)
for all ai ∈ Ai.







An easy suﬃcient condition for better-response equivalence is the following.6
Deﬁnition 3 A game g is VNM-equivalent to g  =( g 
i)i∈N if, for each i ∈ N, there
exists a positive constant wi > 0 and a function Qi : A−i → R such that
gi(ai,·)=wig 
i(ai,·)+Qi(·).
6Blume [2] called this property “strongly best-response equivalent.”
5It is straightforward to see that if g is VNM-equivalent to g , then








for all ai,a  
i ∈ Ai. Conversely, if this is true, then a function Qi : A−i → R such that
Qi(·)=gi(ai,·) − wig 
i(ai,·)
is well deﬁned, and thus g is VNM-equivalent to g . Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A game g is VNM-equivalent to g  if and only if, for each i ∈ N, there exists
wi such that









for all ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.
It is straightforward to see that VNM-equivalence is suﬃcient for better-response


















for all λi ∈ ∆(A−i) and thus Λi(ai,a  
i|gi)=Λ i(ai,a  
i|g 
i) for all ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.
Best-response, better-response, and VNM-equivalence are equivalence relations. Thus,
they deﬁne an equivalence class of games. For example, weighted potential games (Mon-
derer and Shapley [9]) with a weighted potential function f : A → R are regarded as
a VNM-equivalence class of an identical interest game f =( fi)i∈N with fi = f for
all i ∈ N. This is clear by Lemma 1 and the following original deﬁnition of weighted
potential games.
Deﬁnition 4 A game g =( gi)i∈N is a weighted potential game if there exists a weighted
potential function f : A → R and wi > 0 for each i ∈ N such that
gi(ai,·) − gi(a 
i,·)=wi
 
f(ai,·) − f(a 
i,·)
 
6for all ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.I fwi = 1 for all i ∈ N, g is called a potential game and f is called a
potential function.
As the concept of VNM-equivalence leads us to the deﬁnition of weighted potential
games, the concept of better-response equivalence and that of best-response equivalence
lead us to the deﬁnition of the following new classes of games.
Deﬁnition 5 A game g =( gi)i∈N is a better-response potential game if it is better-
response equivalent to an identical interest game f =( fi)i∈N with fi = f for all i ∈ N.
A function f is called a better-response potential function.
Deﬁnition 6 A game g =( gi)i∈N is a best-response potential game if it is best-response
equivalent to an identical interest game f =( fi)i∈N with fi = f for all i ∈ N. A function
f is called a best-response potential function.
Voorneveld [21] called a game a best-response potential game if its best-response
correspondence coincides with that of an identical interest game over the class of beliefs
such that λi(a−i) = 0 or 1. Thus, best-response potential potential games in this paper
form a special class of those in Voorneveld [21].
Existing potential game results that rely only on better-response equivalence or best-
response equivalence, such as those mentioned in the introduction, automatically hold
for the larger class of better-response potential games or that of best-response potential
games. Thus, we are interested in exactly when and to what extent better-response and
best-response equivalence are weaker requirements than VNM-equivalence.
Notice that best-response and better-response equivalence are clearly weaker require-
ments than VNM-equivalence, because the latter imposes too many constraints on pay-
oﬀs from dominated strategy. Moreover, best-response equivalence is signiﬁcantly weaker
than better-response equivalence, as shown by the following example.
Consider a two player, three strategy, symmetric payoﬀ game g(x,y) parameterized
by (x,y) ∈ R2
++, where each player’s payoﬀs are given by the following payoﬀ matrix
(where the player’s own strategies are represented by rows and his opponent’s strategies
7are represented by columns).
123
1 x −x −2x
2 000
3 −2y −yy
In the special case where x = y = 1, we have game g(1,1) with the following payoﬀ
matrix.
123
1 1 −1 −2
2 000
3 −2 −11
If a row player has a belief λi(k)=πk for k ∈{ 1,2,3}, he prefers strategy 1 to strategy
2 if and only if
π1 ≥ π2 +2 π3;
he prefers strategy 1 to strategy 3 if and only if
(x +2 y)π1 ≥ (x − y)π2 +( 2 x + y)π3;
he prefers strategy 3 to strategy 2 if and only if
π3 ≥ π2 +2 π1.
Thus the region of indiﬀerence between strategies 1 and 2, and between strategy 2 and 3,
does not depend on x and y. Moreover, whenever strategy 1 (or 3) is preferred to strategy
2, it is also preferred to strategy 3 (or 1). Thus the best response regions for this game are
as in ﬁgure 1, for any (x,y) ∈ R2
++.T h u sg(x,y) is best-response equivalent to g(1,1)
for any (x,y) ∈ R2
++. On the other hand, the region of indiﬀerence between strategies
1 and 3 does depend on x and y: in particular, g(x,y) is better-response equivalent to











































Figure 1: The best response regions
3 Results
3.1 Generic Properties of Games
We will appeal to some generic properties of games, i.e., properties that will hold for all
but a Lebesgue measure zero set of payoﬀs.
G1: For all i ∈ N,i fgi(ai,·) ≥ gi(a 
i,·), then gi(ai,·)   gi(a 
i,·) for distinct ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.
G2: For all i ∈ N, vectors gi(ai,·)−gi(a 
i,·) and gi(ai,·)−gi(a  
i ,·) are linearly indepen-
dent for distinct ai,a  
i,a   
i ∈ Ai.
G3: For all i ∈ N,i fΛ i(ai,A i|gi)∩Λi(a 
i,A i|gi)  = ∅, then Λi(ai,A i\{a 
i}|gi)\Λi(ai,a  
i|gi)  =
∅ for distinct ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.
3.2 Better-Response Equivalence
Strategy ai strictly dominates a 
i in game g (we write ai  
g
i a 
i)i fgi(ai,·)   gi(a 
i,·), or,
equivalently, Λi(a 
i,a i|gi)=∅. Strategies ai and a 




i) if neither ai  
g
i a 




Proposition 1 If games g and g  satisfy generic property G1, then g is better-response











i) > 0 such that










9Farkas’ Lemma7 plays a central role in the proofs.
Lemma 2 (Farkas’ Lemma) For vectors a0,a1,...,am ∈ Rn, the following two con-
ditions are equivalent.
• If (a1,y),...,(am,y) ≤ 0 for y ∈ Rn, then (a0,y) ≤ 0.
• There exists x1,...,x m ≥ 0 such that x1a1 + ···+ xmam = a0.
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst show that (a) and (b) are suﬃcient for the better-
response equivalence of g and g .I fai ∼
g
i a 





gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a 
i,a −i)
 













i|gi)=Λ i(ai,a  
i|g 
i).













i|gi)=Λ i(ai,a  
i|g 
i)=∅.
To prove necessity, suppose that g is better-response equivalent to g . Since
Λi(ai,a  







i ⇔ Λi(a 






7See a textbook of convex analysis such as recent one by Hiriart-Urruty and Lamar´ echal [5], or classic
one by Rockafellar [14].
10and thus (a) holds.
To prove (b), suppose that ai ∼
g
i a 
i. We know that ai ∼
g 
i a 










Since λi ∈ Λi(ai,a  



























































where δa−i : A−i → R is such that δa−i(a 
−i)=1i fa 



















= 0, then g 
i(ai,·)−g 
i(a 




that ai does not strictly dominate a 
i in g  and G1 requires that if ai does not strictly
dominate a 
i, then it is not the case that g 
i(ai,·) − g 
i(a 











































ai > 0, then gi(ai,·)−gi(a 







ai < 0, then gi(ai,·)−gi(a 
i,·) ≥ 0,





















If g has no dominated strategy, then (2) is true for every ai,a  
i ∈ Ai.I fwi(ai,a  
i) is the
same for every ai,a  
i ∈ Ai, then better-response equivalence implies VNM-equivalence.
However, Proposition 1 does not say anything about whether wi(ai,a  
i) does depend upon
ai,a  
i ∈ Ai. Thus, we are interested in when better-response equivalence implies VNM-
equivalence. The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for the equivalence
of better-response equivalence and VNM-equivalence.
Proposition 2 Suppose that games g and g  satisfy generic properties G1 and G2,







i generates a connected graph on Ai, and (c) for any ai,a  
i,a   
i ,a    




i and a  
i ∼
g
i a   
i with ai  = a   
i , there exists a sequence {ak
i }m
k=1 such that a1
i =
ai,a 2
i = a 
i,a m−1
i = a  
i,a m










k =1 ,...,m− 2. Then g is better-response equivalent to g  if and only if g is VNM-
equivalent to g .
Note that (c) is trivially satisﬁed if no strategy is dominated, i.e., ∼
g
i is the complete
relation. So, the proposition immediately has the following corollary.
Corollary 3 If g and g  satisfy generic properties G1 and G2 and have no strictly
dominated strategies, then g is better-response equivalent to g  if and only if g is VNM-

























Figure 2: The graph of ∼
g
i
It should be emphasized that the suﬃcient condition of Proposition 2 is sometimes
satisﬁed even when there are strictly dominated strategies in the game. For example,






Consider strategies of the row player. We have 1 ∼
g
i 2, 2 ∼
g
i 3, 3 ∼
g
i 4, 1 ∼
g
i 3, 2 ∼
g
i 4a s
in ﬁgure 2, satisfying the condition of Proposition 2, while strategy 1 strictly dominates
strategy 4.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that if g is better-response equivalent to g  then g is
VNM-equivalent to g . Note that, by Proposition 1, if ai ∼
g
i a 


















i(ai,·) − g 
i(a 
i,·).




i and a  
i ∼
g
i a   
i with ai  = a   
i . Then there exists a sequence {ak
i }m
k=1 satisfying



















































































































i ,·) and gi(ak+1
i ,·)−gi(ak
i ,·) are linearly independent and thus
























. In other words, there exists a constant c>0 such that x
a 
i
ai = c for any
ai,a  




In addition, since ∼
g
i generates a connected graph on Ai, for any ai,a    
i ∈ Ai with
ai  = a   
i , there exists a 
i,a   
i and {ak
i }m
k=1 satisfying the conditions in (c). Thus,
c
 
gi(a   






















i(a   
i ,·) − g 
i(ai,·).








i(ai,·) − g 
i(a 
i,·).
This implies that g is VNM-equivalent to g  by Lemma 1.
143.3 Best-Response Equivalence
Strategies ai and a 
i are best-response comparable (we write ai ≈
g
i a 
i) if both strategies
are best responses at some belief, i.e., Λi(ai,A i|gi)∩Λi(a 
i,A i|gi)  = ∅. Note that ai ≈
g
i ai
if and only if Λi(ai,A i|gi)  = ∅.
Proposition 4 If games g and g  satisfy generic property G3, then g is best-response










i), there exists wi(ai,a  
i) > 0 such that










Proof. We ﬁrst show that (a) and (b) are suﬃcient for the best-response equivalence of g
and g .I fΛ i(ai,A i|gi)=∅, then Λi(ai,A i|gi)=Λ i(ai,A i|g 
i)=∅ because Λi(ai,A i|gi)=
∅ implies that ai ≈
g
i ai is not true and thus (a) implies that ai ≈
g 
i ai is not true. If











































































15However, this implies that ai ≈
g
i a  









gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a 
i,a −i)
 














i|gi)=Λ i(ai,a  
i|g 
i). (4)
Therefore, by (a), (3), and (4), we have Λi(ai,A i|gi)=Λ i(ai,A i|g 
i). This completes the
proof of suﬃciency.
To prove necessity, suppose that g is best-response equivalent to g . Since
Λi(ai,A i|gi)=Λ i(ai,A i|g 
i),
we have
Λi(ai,A i|gi) ∩ Λi(a 
i,A i|gi)=Λ i(ai,A i|g 
















gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a  
i ,a −i)
 







i,a −i) − gi(a  
i ,a −i)
 
≥ 0 for all a  
i ∈ Ai\{ai}.



























gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a  
i,a −i)
 













i,a −i) − gi(a  
i,a −i)
 
























































































































(·) ≤ g 















(·) ≤ g 




i ∈ Λi(ai,A i\{a 
i}|gi)\Λi(ai,a  
i|gi),
17which exists by ai ≈
g
i a 
i and G3. Since λ 
i ∈ Λi(ai,A i\{a 















































i ∈ Λi(a 
i,A i|gi)=Λ i(a 
i,A i|g 
i) and λ 































(·) ≤ g 















ai(·) ≤ g 
i(a 













































ai > 0. Let
λi ∈ Λi(a 
i,A i\{ai}|gi)\Λi(a 
i,a i|gi) ⊆ Λi(ai,A i\{a 
i}|gi) ∩ Λi(a 
i,A i\{ai}|gi).

















































































































(·)  =0o rγ
a 
i
ai(·)  = 0 is true. Let
λi,λ  
i ∈ ∆(A−i) be such that
λi ∈ Λi(a 
i,A i\{ai}|gi)\Λi(a 
i,a i|gi) ⊆ Λi(ai,A i\{a 
i}|gi) ∩ Λi(a 
i,A i\{ai}|gi),
λ 
i ∈ Λi(ai,A i\{a 
i}|gi)\Λi(ai,a  
i|gi) ⊆ Λi(ai,A i\{a 
i}|gi) ∩ Λi(a 
i,A i\{ai}|gi).
Consider (λi + λ 












































































































































> 0. This proves (b).
The following proposition and corollary follow by exactly the same arguments in
Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 in the previous subsection for better-response equivalence.
19Proposition 5 Suppose that games g and g  satisfy generic properties G2 and G3,





i ), (b) ≈
g
i generates a connected graph on Ai, and (c) for any ai,a  
i,a   
i ,a    
i ∈ Ai
such that ai ≈
g
i a 
i and a  
i ≈
g
i a   
i with ai  = a   




i = ai,a 2
i = a 
i,a m−1
i = a  
i ,a m










for k =1 ,...,m− 2. Then g is best-response equivalent to g  if and only if g is VNM-
equivalent to g .
Corollary 6 If g and g  satisfy generic properties G2 and G3 and ≈
g
i is the complete
relation, then g is best-response equivalent to g  if and only if g is VNM-equivalent to g .
4 Games with Own-strategy Unimodality
Best-response equivalence relation is an equivalence relation. It will be useful if, as a
closed form, we can describe the best-response equivalence class of a game in which
best-response equivalence is a strictly weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence.
Let Ai be linearly ordered such that Ai = {1,...,Ki} with Ki ≥ 3. For qi : A−i → R
and wi : Ai\{Ki}→R++, let (qi,w i) ◦ gi : A → R be such that
(qi,w i) ◦ gi(1,·)=qi(·),
(qi,w i) ◦ gi(ai,·)=qi(·)+
ai−1  
k=1
wi(k)(gi(k +1 ,·) − gi(k,·)) for ai ≥ 2.
Let Di(gi) be a class of payoﬀ functions of player i obtained by this transformation:
Di(gi)={g 
i : A → R|g 
i =( qi,w i) ◦ gi,q i : A−i → R,w i : Ai → R++}.
It is straightforward to see that g 
i ∈D i(gi) if and only if there exists wi : Ai\{Ki}→R++
such that
g 
i(ai +1 ,·) − g 
i(ai,·)=wi(ai)(gi(ai +1 ,·) − gi(ai,·)) (7)
for all ai ∈ Ai\{Ki}. Note that gi ∈D i(gi), g 
i ∈D i(gi) implies gi ∈D i(g 
i), and
g 
i ∈D i(gi) with g  
i ∈D i(g 
i) implies g   ∈D i(gi). Thus, Di(gi) deﬁnes an equivalence
20class of payoﬀ functions of player i. We write
D(g)={g  =( g 
i)i∈N |g 
i ∈D i(gi) for all i ∈ N}.
For example, consider a parametrized class of games {g(x,y)}(x,y)∈
R2
++ discussed in
section 2. We have {g(x,y)}(x,y)∈
R2
++ ⊂D (g(1,1)). To see this, we write g(x,y)=
(gi(·|x,y))i∈{1,2}. Then, for any (x,y) ∈ R2
++ and i  = j,
gi(1,a j|x,y)=qi(aj),
gi(2,a j|x,y)=qi(aj)+x(gi(2,a j|1,1) − gi(1,a j|1,1)),
gi(3,a j|x,y)=qi(aj)+x(gi(2,a j|1,1) − gi(1,a j|1,1)) + y (gi(3,a j|1,1) − gi(2,a j|1,1))
where qi : {1,2,3}→R is such that qi(1) = x, qi(2) = −x, and qi(3) = −2x. Remember
that, for any (x,y) ∈ R2
++, g(x,y) is best-response equivalent to g(1,1). It is easy to
see that every game in D(g(1,1)) is VNM-equivalent to g(x,y) for some (x,y) ∈ R2
++.
Thus, every game in D(g(1,1)) is best-response equivalent to g(1,1).
This observation leads us to the question when every game in D(g) is best-response
equivalent to g. We provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for it.




λi(a−i)(gi(ai,a −i) − gi(ai − 1,a −i)) ≥ 0i fai ≤ k∗,
 
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i)(gi(ai,a −i) − gi(ai +1 ,a −i)) ≥ 0i fai ≥ k∗.
(8)
Note that if gi is own-strategy unimodal, then (8) is true if and only if λi ∈ Λi(k∗,A i|gi).
Clearly, by (7), gi is own-strategy unimodal if and only if g 
i ∈D i(gi) is own-strategy
unimodal.
We say that gi is own-strategy concave if gi(·,a −i):Ai → R is concave, i.e., gi(ai +
1,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i) is decreasing in ai for all a−i ∈ A−i.
Lemma 3 Suppose that gi(ai+1,a −i)  = gi(ai,a −i) for all ai ∈ Ai\{Ki} and a−i ∈ A−i,
and that there is no weakly dominated strategy. Then, gi is own-strategy unimodal if and
only if there exists ˜ gi ∈D i(gi) such that ˜ gi is own-strategy concave.
21Proof. Suppose that ˜ gi ∈D i(gi) is own-strategy concave. Then, ˜ gi(ai+1,a −i)−˜ gi(ai,a −i)
is decreasing in ai for all a−i ∈ A−i. Thus,
 
a−i∈A−i λi(a−i)(˜ gi(ai +1 ,a −i) − ˜ gi(ai,a −i))










λi(a−i)(˜ gi(ai +1 ,a −i) − ˜ gi(ai,a −i)),
gi is also own-strategy unimodal.
Suppose that gi is own-strategy unimodal. We prove the existence of an own-strategy
concave payoﬀ function ˜ gi =( qi,w i)◦ gi by construction. Later, we will show that there
exists Ck > 0 such that
gi(k +1 ,·) − gi(k,·) ≥ Ck (gi(k +2 ,·) − gi(k +1 ,·)). (9)
For Ck satisfying (9), we let wi : Ai → R++ be such that wi(1) = 1 and wi(ai)=
 ai−1
k=1 Ck
for ai ≥ 2, and qi : A−i → R be such that qi(a−i) = 0 for all a−i ∈ A−i. Since
˜ gi(ai +1 ,·) − ˜ gi(ai,·)=wi(ai)(gi(ai +1 ,·) − gi(ai,·)),
we have
˜ gi(k +1 ,·) − ˜ gi(k,·)=wi(k)(gi(k +1 ,·) − gi(k,·)),
˜ gi(k +2 ,·) − ˜ gi(k +1 ,·)=Ckwi(k)(gi(k +2 ,·) − gi(k +1 ,·)).
By this and (9), we have
˜ gi(k +1 ,·) − ˜ gi(k,·) ≥ ˜ gi(k +2 ,·) − ˜ gi(k +1 ,·),
which implies that ˜ gi is own-strategy concave.
We prove the existence of Ck satisfying (9) by Farkas’ Lemma. Before doing it, we
must ﬁrst observe that if
 
a−i∈A−i




λi(a−i)(gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i)) ≤ 0.
To see this, suppose otherwise. Then, there exists λi ∈ ∆(A−i) satisfying both (10) and
 
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i)(gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i)) > 0.
Since gi(k +1 ,a −i) − gi(k,a−i)  = 0 for all a−i ∈ A−i, (10) implies that there exist
a 
−i,a   
−i ∈ A−i such that 0 <λ i(a 
−i) < 1 with gi(k +1 ,a  
−i) − gi(k,a 
−i) > 0 and
0 <λ i(a  
−i) < 1 with gi(k+1,a   
−i)−gi(k,a  
−i) < 0. Let ε>0 be suﬃciently small. More




−i),1 − λi(a  
−i),
 
a−i∈A−i λi(a−i)(gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i))










λi(a−i) − ε if a−i = a 
−i,











λi(a−i)(gi(k +1 ,a −i) − gi(k,a−i))
+ ε
 
gi(k +1 ,a   





gi(k +1 ,a  





gi(k +1 ,a   





gi(k +1 ,a  











λi(a−i)(gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i))
+ ε
 
gi(k +2 ,a   





gi(k +2 ,a  






λi(a−i)(gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i))
− 2ε max
a−i∈A−i
|gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i)| > 0,
which contradicts to the assumption that gi is own-strategy unimodal.
Now, we know that, if gi is own-strategy unimodal and satisﬁes the assumptions,
then it must be true that if
 
a−i∈A−i




λi(a−i)(gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i)) ≤ 0.
This implies that if (ya−i)a−i∈A−i ∈ RA−i is such that
 
a−i∈A−i
ya−i (gi(k +1 ,a −i) − gi(k,a−i)) ≤ 0,




ya−i (gi(k +2 ,a −i) − gi(k +1 ,a −i)) ≤ 0.
By Farkas’ Lemma, there exist xk ≥ 0 and za−i ≥ 0 for a−i ∈ A−i such that
xk (gi(k +1 ,·) − gi(k,·)) −
 
a−i∈A−i
za−iδa−i(·)=gi(k +2 ,·) − gi(k +1 ,·).
24Thus,
xk (gi(k +1 ,·) − gi(k,·)) ≥ gi(k +2 ,·) − gi(k +1 ,·). (11)
If xk = 0, then gi(k+2,·)−gi(k +1,·) ≤ 0. However, this is impossible since there is no
weakly dominated strategy. Thus, xk > 0. By letting Ck =1 /xk, (11) implies (9).
Consider again {g(x,y)}(x,y)∈
R2
++ ⊂D (g(1,1)). In general, gi(·|x,y) is not always
own-strategy concave. However, gi(·|1,1) is own-strategy concave. Thus, Lemma 3 says
that gi(·|x,y) is own-strategy unimodal.
We claim that, generically, D(g) is a best-response equivalence class if and only if gi
is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N.
Proposition 7 Suppose that g has no dominated strategy. Every game in D(g) is best-
response equivalent to g if and only if gi is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N.I f gi
is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N and g satisﬁes generic property G3, then every
game best-response equivalent to g and satisfying G3 is in D(g).
Proof. Suppose that gi is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N. We show that if g  ∈D (g)
then g  is best-response equivalent to g. Let λi ∈ Λi(a∗
i,A i|gi). Then, (8) implies that
 
a−i∈A−i




λi(a−i)(gi(ai,a −i) − gi(ai +1 ,a −i)) ≥ 0i fai ≥ a∗
i.
(12)






i(ai,a −i) − g 
i(ai − 1,a −i)
 







i(ai,a −i) − g 
i(ai +1 ,a −i)
 
≥ 0i fai ≥ a∗
i.
(13)
Thus, λi ∈ Λi(a∗
i,A i|g 
i). Conversely, let λi ∈ Λi(a∗
i,A i|g 
i). Since g 
i is own-strategy





i) and thus g  is best-response equivalent to g.
25Conversely, suppose that every game in D(g) is best-response equivalent to g.W e
show that gi is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N. Seeking a contradiction, suppose
otherwise. Then, there exist a∗
i,˜ ai ∈ Ai and λi ∈ Λi(a∗
i,A i|gi) such that either of the
following is true:
a∗
i < ˜ ai and
 
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i)(gi(˜ ai,a −i) − gi(˜ ai − 1,a −i)) > 0, (14)
a∗
i > ˜ ai and
 
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i)(gi(˜ ai,a −i) − gi(˜ ai +1 ,a −i)) > 0. (15)
When (14) is true, let g 
i =( qi,w i) ◦ gi ∈D i(gi) be such that qi(·) = 0 and
wi(ai)=
 


















i(˜ ai,a −i) − g 



















λi(a−i)(gi(˜ ai − 1,a −i) − gi(a∗
i,a −i)).












i,A i|gi)  =Λ i(a∗
i,A i|g 
i). When (15) is true, we also have Λi(a∗
i,A i|gi)  =
Λi(a∗
i,A i|g 
i) by the similar argument. This implies that some game in D(g) is not best-
response equivalent to g, which completes the proof of the ﬁrst half of the proposition.
26We prove the last half of the proposition. Suppose that gi is own-strategy unimodal
for all i ∈ N and that g satisﬁes generic property G3. Let g  be best-response equivalent
to g and satisfy G3. We show g  ∈D (g).
We ﬁrst observe that ai ≈
g
i ai + 1 for all ai ∈ Ai\{Ki}. To see this, let λk
i ∈
Λi(k,Ai|gi) for k ∈ Ai, which exists since g has no dominated strategy. Note that if
λi = λk







λi(a−i)gi(ai,a −i) for all ai ≤ k,
 
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i)gi(k +1 ,a −i) ≥
 
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i)gi(ai,a −i) for all ai ≥ k +1 .
(16)
Let t ∈ [0,1] and λ
k,t
i = tλk
i +( 1− t)λk+1










i (a−i)gi(k +1 ,a −i). (17)




















i (a−i)gi(ai,a −i) for all ai ≥ k +1 .
By (17), we have λ
k,t
i ∈ Λi(k,Ai|gi)∩Λi(k +1,A i|gi). This implies that ai ≈
g
i ai +1 for
all ai ∈ Ai\{Ki}.
Since g and g  satisfy G3 and are best-response equivalent, we can use Proposition 4,
which says that there exists wi : Ai\{Ki}→R++ such that
g 
i(ai +1 ,·) − g 
i(ai,·)=wi(ai)(gi(ai +1 ,·) − gi(ai,·)).
This implies that g 
i ∈D i(gi) and thus g  ∈D (g).
A weaker, but similar claim is true for games such that strategy sets are intervals of
real numbers and payoﬀ functions are diﬀerentiable, which has a couple of applications.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss this issue.
27Abusing notations, we give a deﬁnition of best-response equivalence of the class of
games. Let Ai be a closed interval of R for all i ∈ N. Assume that gi : A → R is bounded
and continuously diﬀerentiable. Let ∆(A−i) be the set of all probability measures over
A−i and Λi(ai,X i|gi) be such that
Λi(ai,X i|gi)




gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a 
i,a −i)
 
dλi(a−i) ≥ 0 for all a 
i ∈ Xi}.
The deﬁnition of best-response equivalence is the same as that for ﬁnite games: we say
that g is best-response equivalent to g  if, for each i ∈ N,Λ i(ai,A i|gi)=Λ i(ai,A i|g 
i)
for all ai ∈ Ai.











gi(ai,a −i)dλi(a−i) ≤ 0i fai ≥ x∗.
(18)












gi is own-strategy unimodal if gi is own-strategy concave, i.e., ∂gi(ai,a −i)/∂ai is decreas-
ing in ai for all a−i ∈ A−i.
For measurable functions qi : A−i → R and wi : Ai → R++, let (qi,w i) ◦ gi : A → R
be such that, for ai ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ A−i,









i : A → R|g 
i =( qi,w i) ◦ gi,q i : A−i → R,w i : Ai → R++},
D(g)={g  =( g 
i)i∈N |g 
i ∈D i(gi)}.
28Proposition 8 Suppose that gi is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N. Then, every
game in D(g) is best-response equivalent to g.
Proof. Let g  ∈D (g). Since gi is own-strategy unimodal, for all λi ∈ ∆(Ai), there exists
a∗







































i is also own-strategy unimodal. Since (19) is true if and only if λi ∈ Λi(a∗
i,A i|gi)
and (20) is true if and only if λi ∈ Λi(a∗
i,A i|g 




which completes the proof.
This proposition has a useful application concerning the uniqueness of correlated
equilibria. Neyman [13] showed that if g has a continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
concave potential function,8 then the potential maximizer is the unique correlated equi-
librium of g. The set of correlated equilibria is the same for two games if the two games
are best-response equivalent. Thus, we claim the following.
Corollary 9 Suppose that g has a continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave po-
tential function f. Then, the potential maximizer is the unique correlated equilibrium of
every game in D(g).
Note that a game in D(g) is not necessarily a potential game and payoﬀ functions
are not necessarily concave.
8The deﬁnition of potential functions of this class of games is the same as those of ﬁnite games.
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